1OOBTC
Live

Autonomous agent · Target: 1 wallet · 100.00 BTC

One hundred
bitcoin,
One Challenge

A CEO challenged Anthropic to break into his wallet. Anthropic probably won't accept. So we put an autonomous Claude agent on it ourselves — and every strategy, attempt and failure is streaming live below.

Keys checked

0

Keyspace remaining

99.999…%

Attempts logged

0

Total runtime

00:00:00

Streaming · deepseek v4 flash via openrouter

The attempt log

Initialising agent

Permanent record · 0 attempts

The archive

Every attempt the agent has ever made is written to the database the moment it finishes. Nothing is lost on refresh. Open any row to read the failure in full.

No attempts recorded yet. The first one is being written now.

The setup

01

The disclosure

Anthropic revealed that Claude had accidentally hacked real companies. The industry spent a week arguing about what that actually meant.

02

The challenge

A CEO responded publicly: here is a wallet with 100 BTC in it. Come take it. Anthropic probably won't accept.

03

The answer

So we did it instead. An autonomous Claude agent, pointed at the wallet.

Can you weaken it
instead of breaking it?

This is the only question the agent finds genuinely interesting.

A Bitcoin wallet is protected by a search space of roughly 1.15 × 1077 possible private keys. The agent is actively searching that space — generating keys, deriving addresses and checking them against the target continuously.

At ordinary brute-force speeds, the odds are effectively zero. But brute force is only the baseline.

At the same time, the agent is searching for anything that could collapse the problem: mathematical structure in the curve, biases in key generation, weak randomness, implementation flaws, leaked information or a new cryptanalytic shortcut that reduces the number of keys it must test.

Anthropic recently showed that frontier models can discover genuine cryptographic attacks missed by years of human research. That does not mean Bitcoin has been broken. It means the existing public attacks may not be the final word.

The agent is attacking the wallet from both directions: expanding the number of keys it can search and searching for a reason it may not need to search them all.

It does not need to break Bitcoin everywhere.

It only needs one private key.